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Introduction 
In the Federalist Papers, James Madison invited readers to consider the hypothetical case 
of a federal Constitution that provided for the supremacy of state law over federal law. In that 
case, he said, “the world would have seen, for the first time, a system of government founded on 
an inversion of the fundamental principles of all government; it would have seen the authority of 
the whole society everywhere subordinate to the authority of the parts; it would have seen a 
monster, in which the head was under the direction of the members.”1 The modern doctrine of 
non-self-executing treaties (NSE doctrine) illustrates the problems posed by Madison’s 
hypothetical monster.  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín v. Texas is an example.2 The United States has 
a treaty obligation under Article 94 of the UN Charter “to comply with the decision of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in any case to which it is a party.”3 When President Truman 
ratified the Charter in 1945, after the Senate voted 89-2 in favor of ratification, the United States 
made a binding commitment to comply with ICJ decisions. Since the Charter was ratified, 
neither Congress nor any President has repudiated that commitment. At issue in Medellín was the 
ICJ decision in the “Avena case,” where the ICJ ordered the U.S. to provide judicial hearings for 
51 Mexican nationals on death row in the United States.4 Medellín was one of the named 
Mexican nationals; he was on death row in Texas. President Bush directed State courts to “give 
effect to the [Avena] decision . . . in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that 
decision.”5 However, Texas defied the President’s order and the U.S. Supreme Court allowed 
Texas to do so. The Court based its decision on the distinction between “self-executing” and 
“non-self-executing” treaties. As a result of Medellín, the United States stands in ongoing 
violation of a legally binding treaty commitment, but no national political authority ever decided 
to violate the treaty. Thanks to Medellín, and to the transformation of NSE doctrine after World 
War II,6 Madison’s monster has come to life. The head is under the direction of the members. 
On the other hand, perhaps the head retains control. Even after Medellín, Congress could 
enact legislation requiring Texas and other states to comply with the Avena decision, or with ICJ 
decisions generally. Several bills to that effect have been proposed, but Congress has not enacted 
such legislation.7 Recently, Congress has been so deeply divided that it is difficult to pass any 
                                                          
1 Federalist 44 (James Madison). 
2 552 U.S. 491 (2008) 
3 UN Charter, art. 94. 
4 Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 1 (Mar. 31). 
5 Medellin, 552 U.S., at 503. 
6 See infra notes __ and accompanying text (discussing the transformation of NSE doctrine after World War II). 
7 See Steve Charnovitz, Correcting America’s Continuing Failure to Comply with the Avena Judgment, 106 Am. J. 
Int’l L. 572, 576-79 (2012) (discussing bills introduced in Congress). 
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new federal legislation. Therefore, given congressional inertia, the real choice for the Court in 
Medellín was whether to place the weight of congressional inertia on the side of compliance or 
non-compliance. By holding that Article 94 is not self-executing, the Court chose non-
compliance, but NSE doctrine did not require that choice. The Court could have chosen 
compliance by holding that Article 94 is self-executing and binding on Texas. In that scenario, 
also, Congress could have passed legislation to override the Court’s decision. Therefore, NSE 
doctrine is consistent with federal political control, at least in theory. 
The key words in the previous sentence are the words “in theory.” To confront Madison’s 
monster, we must move from theory to practice. In practice, judicial application of NSE doctrine 
is almost entirely arbitrary. Courts decide whether a treaty is self-executing by invoking the 
“intent of the treaty makers.”8 In the vast majority of cases, that “intent” is purely fictitious; it is 
a judicial fabrication. If a court finds that the treaty makers intended the treaty to be self-
executing, it places congressional inertia on the side of compliance. But if the court finds that the 
treaty makers intended the treaty to be non-self-executing, it places congressional inertia on the 
side of non-compliance. Since the courts do not want to admit that they are making decisions 
about treaty compliance, they hide behind a fictitious “intent of the treaty makers” to evade 
responsibility for their decisions. Insofar as state courts engage in this behavior, Madison’s 
monster is real. However, federal court decisions applying the fictitious intent test are more 
numerous than state court decisions. Therefore, in practice, the main problem involves a transfer 
of power over treaty compliance decisions from the federal political branches to federal courts. 
Since federal courts are not politically accountable, decisions about whether to comply with 
national treaty obligations are being made by government actors who lack political 
accountability. Treaty violations by state and local government officers are largely a 
consequence of federal court decisions applying a fictitious intent test to justify a holding that a 
treaty is not self-executing. 
This article analyzes the development and application of the fictitious intent test that is 
the cornerstone of modern NSE doctrine; I focus on the practical implications of the fictitious 
intent test for the supremacy of treaties over state law. The analysis is divided into four parts. 
Part One distinguishes among three distinct concepts of self-execution. Part Two summarizes the 
historical evolution of self-execution doctrine. Part Three presents a detailed analysis of the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Medellín; it demonstrates that the Court applied a fictitious intent 
test in Medellín. Moreover, the Court’s decision effectively authorized state government officers 
to breach U.S. treaty obligations, even though the federal political branches never approved such 
violations. Part Four presents recommendations for the political branches and the courts. The 
recommendations are designed to ensure that, in matters related to treaty implementation, the 
head retains control of the members—not just in theory, but also in practice. 
 
                                                          
8 See Medellín, 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008) (treaties “are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted 
implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be self-executing”); Restatement (Third), § 
111(4) (an international agreement is non-self-executing “if the agreement manifests an intention that it shall not 
become effective as domestic law without the enactment of implementing legislation”). 
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I. 
Three Concepts of Self-Execution  
Courts and commentators agree that an NSE treaty requires implementing legislation. 
However, for what purpose is legislation needed? Existing doctrine provides three different 
answers to that question. Those three answers correspond to the “congressional-executive” 
concept, the “federal-state” concept, and the “political-judicial” concept of self-execution. 
Under the political-judicial concept, self-executing treaty provisions are judicially 
enforceable, but courts may not directly apply NSE treaty provisions unless Congress enacts 
implementing legislation.9 Under this concept, unlike the congressional-executive concept, 
federal executive officers are empowered to implement both SE and NSE treaty provisions, and 
need not await legislative authorization to do so. The Supreme Court applied the political-
judicial concept in The Head Money Cases,10 without using the term “self-executing.” There, the 
Court said that “the judicial courts have nothing to do [with NSE treaties] and can give no 
redress.” However, SE treaties “are capable of enforcement as between private parties in the 
courts of the country.”11 
The American Law Institute (ALI) is preparing a Fourth Restatement on U.S. foreign 
relations law. The recent Discussion Draft defines self-execution in terms of the political-judicial 
concept. It says: “The essential inquiry for self-execution . . . is whether a treaty provision is 
directly enforceable by the courts. . . . [A]lthough it is often noted that a non-self-executing 
treaty provision requires implementing legislation . . . that is not inherent in the nature of non-
self-execution.”12 The Reporters’ choice to define self-execution in terms of judicial 
enforcement, instead of the need for implementing legislation, is at odds with the weight of 
authority on the subject.13 In essence, the Reporters have adopted the political-judicial concept as 
THE definition of self-execution. In doing so, they disregard a large body of evidence—
summarized in this article—showing that the courts and the political branches also apply the 
congressional-executive concept and the federal state concept. 
Under the “federal-state” concept, an SE treaty automatically supersedes conflicting state 
laws; no legislation is necessary to give the treaty preemptive effect. Conversely, an NSE treaty 
does not automatically supersede conflicting state laws because federal legislation is necessary to 
implement the treaty. The California Supreme Court applied the federal-state concept in Fujii v. 
State, where it held that a treaty “does not automatically supersede local laws which are 
inconsistent with it unless the treaty provisions are self-executing.”14 The Restatement (Second) 
                                                          
9 The doctrine does not preclude indirect application by, for example, consulting a treaty as an aid to statutory 
interpretation. 
10 112 U.S. 580 (1884).  
11 Id., at 598-99. 
12 Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law, Treaties (Discussion Draft, April 28, 2015) § 106 cmt. b 
[hereinafter, Discussion Draft].  
13 Accord, Carlos M. Vazquez, Four Problems with the Draft Restatement’s Treatment of Treaty Self-Execution, 
[this volume]. 
14 242 P.2d 617, 620 (CA 1952). 
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of Foreign Relations Law also endorsed the federal-state concept.15 Part Two shows that the 
federal-state concept arose after World War II in the context of heated political debates about the 
“Bricker Amendment” and judicial application of the UN Charter’s human rights provisions. 
Under the “congressional-executive” concept, congressional legislation is necessary to 
authorize federal executive action pursuant to an NSE treaty.16 Conversely, the President has the 
authority to implement an SE treaty, and need not await implementing legislation to do so. The 
Supreme Court applied the congressional-executive concept in Cook v. United States, where it 
said: “For in a strict sense the Treaty was self-executing, in that no legislation was necessary to 
authorize executive action pursuant to its provisions.”17 Parts One and Two demonstrate that the 
congressional-executive concept has been the dominant concept of self-execution for most of 
U.S. history. 
 
A. Three Conceps in Medellín 
In Medellin v. Texas,18  Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion applied all three concepts 
interchangeably, without acknowledging the differences among them. In part II of the opinion, 
the Court vacillated between the federal-state concept and the political-judicial concept. For 
example, Roberts said that Article 94 and Avena “does not of its own force constitute binding 
federal law that pre-empts [contrary] state” law.19 In this passage, the Court seemingly applied 
the federal-state concept. Elsewhere, though, the Court seemingly applied the political-judicial 
concept. For example, Roberts wrote that “[t]he pertinent international agreements . . . do not 
provide for implementation of ICJ judgments through direct enforcement in domestic courts.”20 
This passage emphasized the limitations on the judiciary’s power to enforce treaties, in 
accordance with the political-judicial concept. 
In part III of its opinion, the Court rejected the U.S. government’s argument that the 
President’s memorandum required Texas courts to grant Medellín a judicial hearing.21 The Court 
said: “A non-self-executing treaty, by definition, is one that was ratified with the understanding 
that it is not to have domestic effect of its own force.”22 Since an NSE treaty is not domestic law, 
“[t]he responsibility for transforming an international obligation arising from a non-self-
executing treaty into domestic law falls to Congress.”23 The conclusion that congressional action 
is necessary follows from “the fundamental constitutional principle that the power to make the 
                                                          
15 See Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 141 (stating that an NSE treaty 
does not “supersede inconsistent provisions . . . of the law of the several states”). 
16 Under this concept, legislation may also be necessary to impose domestic legal duties on federal executive 
officers. Power-constraining treaty provisions impose duties on the executive branch if they are self-executing, 
whereas power-enhancing provisions augment federal executive authority if they are self-executing. 
17 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933). 
18 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
19 Id. at 522-23. 
20 Id. at 513. 
21 The President’s “directive” to state courts was included in a memorandum from President Bush to the Attorney 
General, referred to as “the President’s memorandum.” See id., at 503. 
22 Id., at 527. 
23 Id., at 525-26. 
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necessary laws is in Congress; the power to execute in the President.”24 In the Court’s view, the 
President’s memorandum could not be justified as a valid exercise of the President’s power to 
execute the law because Article 94 of the UN Charter is not domestic law.25 Therefore, the 
President’s memorandum was an invalid attempt “to enforce a non-self-executing treaty by 
unilaterally creating domestic law.”26 In sum, Part III of the Court’s opinion clearly applies the 
congressional-executive concept of self-execution. 
The political-judicial concept cannot explain part III because, under the political-judicial 
concept, an NSE treaty is law for the executive branch. However, the core rationale in part III 
hinges on the assumption that an NSE treaty is not law for the executive branch—i.e., it does not 
authorize the President to take action that would be unauthorized, absent the treaty. Without that 
assumption, the rationale of part III simply evaporates. Granted, the Court said in Medellín that 
“[t]he President may comply with the treaty’s obligations by some other means,” but not “by 
unilaterally making the treaty binding on domestic courts.”27 That statement, though, is merely a 
throw-away line. The ICJ decision required the United States to provide a judicial hearing for 
Medellín.28 Courts are the only institutions in the United States capable of providing a judicial 
hearing. Therefore, if the President could not make the ICJ decision binding on domestic courts, 
he could not “comply with the treaty’s obligations by some other means.” To put it bluntly, the 
only way to comply with an obligation to provide a judicial hearing is to provide a judicial 
hearing. The Court was surely aware of this fact when it pronounced, rather disingenuously, that 
the President could comply with the Avena judgment by some other means. 
 
B. Three Concepts in Senate Treaty Practice 
In September 2008, in an unprecedented burst of treaty activity, the Senate consented to 
78 treaties in four days.29 The Senate’s unusual flurry of activity was a response to the Court’s 
March 2008 decision in Medellín. Senate treaty actions in September 2008 provide the best 
evidence of the treaty makers’ understanding of the terms “self-executing” and “non-self-
executing.” 
For seven of the 78 treaties, the Senate adopted declarations specifying that the treaty is 
“not self-executing” (NSE declarations).30 For 69 other treaties, it adopted declarations 
                                                          
24 Id., at 526. 
25 See id., at 532 (stating that the President’s constitutional authority under the Take Care Clause “allows the 
President to execute the laws, not make them”). 
26 Id., at 527. 
27 Id., at 530. 
28 See Avena judgment, supra note __, ¶¶ 128-41, 153. 
29 See 154 Cong. Rec. 20166-20174; 154 Cong. Rec. 21775-21778; 154 Cong Rec. 22464-22465. 
30 See 1992 Partial Revision of the Radio Regulations, S. Treaty Doc. 107-17 (resolution of ratification at 154 Cong. 
Rec. 20170-71); 1995 Revision of the Radio Regulations, S. Treaty Doc. 108-28 (resolution of ratification at 154 
Cong. Rec. 20171); Land-Based Sources Protocol to the Cartagena Convention, S. Treaty Doc. 110-1 (resolution of 
ratification at 154 Cong. Rec. 21776); 1998 Amendments to the Constitution and the Convention of the International 
Telecommunication Union, S. Treaty Doc. 108-5 (resolution of ratification at 154 Cong. Rec. 21778); 2002 
Amendments to the Constitution and the Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, S. Treaty Doc. 
109-11 (resolution of ratification at 154 Cong. Rec. 21778); 2006 Amendments to the Constitution and the 
Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, S. Treaty Doc. 110-16 (resolution of ratification at 154 
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specifying that the treaty is either wholly or partially self-executing.31 The Senate did not 
specifically define the term “self-executing” or “non-self-executing.” However, Senate 
resolutions for eight treaties (the “eight key treaties”) shed light on its apparent understanding of 
those terms. For three of the eight treaties, the Senate adopted declarations substantially 
equivalent to the following: “This Protocol is self-executing. This Protocol does not confer 
private rights enforceable in United States courts.”32 For the other five treaties, the Senate 
declarations specified that the treaty was partially SE and partially NSE. Those declarations 
included language substantially equivalent to the following: “None of the provisions in the 
Convention . . . confer private rights enforceable in United States courts.”33  
The Senate clearly did not conceive of self-execution in terms of the federal-state 
concept, because all of the eight key treaties address matters governed by federal law, not state 
law.34 Moreover, the Senate did not conceive of self-execution in terms of the political-judicial 
concept. For the eight key treaties, it declared in a single paragraph that the treaty was wholly or 
partially self-executing AND that it was not “enforceable in United States courts.” If the Senate 
understood self-execution in terms of the political-judicial concept, those two statements would 
be mutually contradictory because, under the political-judicial concept, “self-executing” means 
“enforceable in courts.” In contrast, there is no contradiction under the congressional-executive 
concept because “self-executing” means that legislation is not needed to authorize federal 
executive action pursuant to the treaty. Therefore, the declarations for the eight key treaties make 
it abundantly clear that the Senate understood self-execution in terms of the congressional-
executive concept, not the political-judicial concept.35 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Cong. Rec. 21778); International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships, S. Treaty 
Doc. 110-13 (resolution of ratification at 154 Cong. Rec. 22465). 
31 See 154 Cong. Rec. 20166-20174; 154 Cong. Rec. 21775-21778; 154 Cong Rec. 22464-22465. The two treaties 
for which the Senate did not adopt either an SE declaration or an NSE declaration are: Protocol to the North Atlantic 
Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of the Republic of Albania, S. Treaty Doc. 110-20 (resolution of ratification at 154 
Cong. Rec. 21777); Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of the Republic of Croatia, S. 
Treaty Doc. 110-20 (resolution of ratification at 154 Cong. Rec. 21777). 
32 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, S. Treaty Doc. 105-1(B) (resolution 
of ratification at 154 Cong. Rec. 20171) (emphasis added). See also Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, S. Treaty 
Doc. 105-1(C) (resolution of ratification at 154 Cong. Rec. 20171); Amendment to Article 1 of Convention on 
Conventional Weapons, S. Treaty Doc. 109-10(B) (resolution of ratification at 154 Cong. Rec. 20171).  
33 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, S. Treaty Doc. 110-4 (resolution of 
ratification at 154 Cong. Rec. 21776-77) (emphasis added). See also Hague Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, S. Treaty Doc. 106-1(A) (resolution of ratification at 154 Cong. 
Rec. 21776); Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, S. Treaty Doc. 110-6 
(resolution of ratification at 154 Cong. Rec. 21776); 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol, S. Treaty Doc. 110-8 
(resolution of ratification at 154 Cong. Rec. 21777); Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, S. Treaty Doc. 109-
10(C) (resolution of ratification at 154 Cong. Rec. 22464-65). 
34 See treaties cited in two previous footnotes. 
35 The ALI Discussion Draft claims that one of the eight key declarations—the one attached to the Hague 
Convention on Cultural Property—shows only that the Senate rejected the “private right of action” version of SE 
doctrine. See Discussion Draft, supra note __, § 106, n.4. With due respect for the Reporters, that claim is not 
plausible. None of the eight declarations uses the term “private right of action.” All eight declarations say that the 
treaties are not “enforceable in United States courts.” The statement that the treaties are not enforceable in courts, 
combined with the statement that the treaties are partially or wholly self-executing, demonstrates clearly that the 
Senate understood self-execution in terms of the congressional-executive concept, not the political-judicial concept. 
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The ALI Discussion Draft cites the Secretary of State’s report on the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities as evidence that the political branches understand self-
execution in terms of the political-judicial concept.36 On closer examination, though, the Senate 
record for the Disabilities Convention demonstrates persuasively that the political branches do 
not understand NSE declarations in terms of the political-judicial concept. The Senate 
Committee Report for the Disabilities Convention explains the NSE declaration as follows: “This 
[declaration] reflects the shared understanding of the committee and the executive branch that 
the provisions of the Treaty are not self-executing, are not directly enforceable in U.S. courts, 
and do not confer private rights of action enforceable in the United States.”37 If the political 
branches understood self-execution in terms of the political-judicial concept, the statements that 
the treaty provisions “are not self-executing” and “not directly enforceable in U.S. courts” would 
be entirely redundant. In contrast, the redundancy is eliminated if one construes “not self-
executing” to mean “not supreme law of the land,” as in the federal-state concept.38 Under the 
federal-state concept, the statements that the treaty provisions are “not directly enforceable” and 
“do not confer private rights of action” are not redundant because they both follow as a logical 
consequence from the statement that the provisions are “not self-executing” (i.e., not supreme 
law of the land). 
It is important, here, to highlight a key difference between the Disabilities Convention 
and the eight treaties that combine SE declarations with “not enforceable in courts.” Whereas 
those eight treaties address matters governed exclusively by federal law, the Disabilities 
Convention also addresses matters governed by state law. Hence, the political branches wanted 
to clarify that the Disabilities Convention will not operate as a rule of conduct for federal 
executive officers (per the congressional-executive concept) and that it will not supersede 
conflicting state laws (per the federal-state concept). If the NSE declaration attached to the 
Disabilities Convention is construed in accordance with the federal-state concept, it expresses 
both ideas simultaneously. Since an NSE treaty is not the “supreme law of the land” under the 
federal-state concept, it necessarily follows that it does not operate as a rule of conduct for 
federal executive officers.  
In sum, analysis of recent Senate treaty actions demonstrates clearly that the Senate does 
not understand self-execution in terms of the political-judicial concept. Thus, the ALI’s attempt 
to define self-execution in terms of the political-judicial concept is at odds with the Senate’s 
understanding and with part III of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Medellín. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
36 See Discussion Draft, § 106, note 4 (citing and quoting S. Treaty Doc. 112-6, at 6). 
37 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, S. Exec. Rep. 112-6 (2012), at 14; see also Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, S. Exec. Rep. 113-12 (2014), at 23 (repeating the identical language). 
38 Here, I assume that the statement that a treaty “does not supersede conflicting state laws” is equivalent to a 
statement that it is not “the supreme law of the land.” 
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II. 
A Brief History of Self-Execution Doctrine 
The standard account of self-execution identifies Chief Justice Marshall’s 1829 opinion 
in Foster v. Neilson39 as the source of modern doctrine. That account is mistaken in several 
respects. First, judges cite Foster as authority for the “one-step approach” to SE analysis, but 
Marshall applied a “two-step approach” in Foster.40  Professor Edwin Dickinson invented the 
one-step approach in a law review article published in 1926.41 Second, judges cite Foster as 
authority for the federal-state concept of self-execution, but Foster did not implicate state law. 
The federal-state concept emerged in the 1950s in response to the advent of modern international 
human rights law. Third, the misguided focus on Foster creates the false impression that courts 
developed self-execution doctrine. In fact, courts said very little about self-execution before 
World War I; legislative and executive materials were the primary sources of authority until the 
1920s. Part Two presents a brief history of SE doctrine. This account distinguishes between the 
“main channel” of historical development and two “side channels.”42 
 
A. The Main Channel of Doctrinal Evolution 
Phase One: The main body of SE doctrine developed in four phases. In phase one, self-
execution was a constitutional doctrine that corresponded with the congressional-executive 
concept (the constitutional doctrine). The SE/NSE dichotomy distinguished between: (a) treaties 
that the President has constitutional authority to implement, without awaiting congressional 
authorization (self-executing); and (b) treaties that the President lacks authority to implement 
until Congress enacts implementing legislation (non-self-executing). Congress discussed self-
execution extensively in debates related to: implementation of the Jay Treaty in 1795-96;43 an 
1815 commercial treaty with Great Britain;44 the 1867 treaty acquiring Alaska from Russia;45 
and an 1884 commercial treaty with Hawaii.46 Legislators never agreed fully about which 
treaties are SE and which ones are NSE. However, they did agree that the SE/NSE distinction 
was a federal separation-of-powers concept rooted in U.S. constitutional law, not a treaty 
interpretation doctrine rooted in international law. In the nineteenth century, legislative materials 
on self-execution were far more voluminous than judicial decisions on the topic. 
                                                          
39 27 U.S. 253 (1829). 
40 See David Sloss, Executing Foster v. Neilson: The Two-Step-Approach to Analyzing Self-Executing Treaties, 53 
Harv. Int’l L. J. 135 (2012); see also infra notes __ and accompanying text (explaining the “one-step” and “two-
step” approaches). 
41 Edwin D. Dickinson, Are the Liquor Treaties Self-Executing?, 20 Am. J. Int’l L. 444 (1926). 
42 The account presented here relies heavily on David Sloss, Invisible Constitutional Transformation: The Silent 
Death of the Constitution’s Treaty Supremacy Rule (manuscript on file with author) (providing detailed 
documentation to support claims made in this section). 
43 See 5 Annals of Cong. 426-783; John T. Parry, Congress, the Supremacy Clause, and the Implementation of 
Treaties, 32 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1209, 1276-94 (2009). 
44 See 29 Annals of Cong. 46-54, 419-595, 1019-22; Parry, supra note __, at 1303-16. 
45 See 39 Cong. Globe 4055 (40th Cong., 2nd Sess, July 14, 1868); 15 Stat. 198 (July 27, 1868); SAMUEL B. 
CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 135-47 (1904). 
46 See Treaty with the Hawaiian Islands, H.R. Rep. No. 49-4177 (1887); Jean Galbraith, Congress’s Treaty-
Implementing Power in Historical Practice, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 59, 89-93 (2014). 
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Phase Two: In phase two, the focus shifted from Congress to the executive branch. In 
nineteenth century congressional debates, the most contentious constitutional issue involved 
treaties reducing import duties. Members of the House of Representatives routinely insisted that 
such treaties were constitutionally NSE.47 To sidestep the constitutional issue, the executive 
branch began to insert “condition precedent clauses” in treaties. Those clauses specified that the 
treaty would not enter into force internationally until after Congress enacted implementing 
legislation. The first such treaty was signed in 1854.48 Article V specified: “The present treaty 
shall take effect as soon as the laws required to carry it into operation shall have been passed by 
the Imperial Parliament of Great Britain . . . on the one hand, and by the Congress of the United 
States on the other.”  
In the late nineteenth century, the executive branch routinely added condition precedent 
clauses to treaties affecting import duties.49 By inserting condition precedent clauses, the 
executive branch effectively bypassed legislative debates about whether the treaty was 
constitutionally NSE. Since the treaty did not enter into force internationally until after Congress 
enacted implementing legislation, the self-execution issue became irrelevant. Condition 
precedent clauses can be viewed as the nineteenth century predecessor of modern NSE 
declarations, but they differ from NSE declarations in certain respects. Condition precedent 
clauses required legislation as a precondition for the treaty to take effect internationally. In 
contrast modern NSE declarations do not affect international entry into force. Instead, modern 
NSE declarations require legislation as a precondition for the treaty to “take effect” domestically. 
(Leave aside, for now, the question of precisely what it means for a treaty to “take effect” 
domestically.) By adopting condition precedent clauses, the nineteenth century treaty makers 
(i.e., the President and Senate, acting together under the Article II Treaty Power) applied their 
power over international law to establish preconditions for the treaty to take effect 
internationally. In contrast, by adopting NSE declarations, modern treaty makers apply their 
power over domestic law to establish preconditions for the treaty to take effect domestically, 
even after it has entered into force internationally.50 
 
Phase Three: Phase three began in 1926 when Edwin Dickinson published an article 
entitled Are the Liquor Treaties Self-Executing?51 The “liquor treaties” in the article’s title were 
a set of bilateral treaties with sixteen countries to help enforce Prohibition-era laws banning 
liquor imports.52 Before the treaties were concluded, federal statutes imposed a 12-mile limit on 
                                                          
47 See, e.g., Treaty with the Hawaiian Islands, H.R. Rep. No. 49-4177 (1887); CRANDALL, supra note __, at 135-47. 
48 Fisheries, Commerce, and Navigation in North America, June 5, 1854, U.S.-U.K., 10 Stat. 1089.   
49 See, e.g., Treaty of Washington, May 8, 1871, U.S.-U.K., 17 Stat. 863; Treaty of Reciprocity, Jan. 30, 1875, U.S.-
Hawaii, 19 Stat. 625; Convention on Commerce, Jan. 20, 1883, U.S.-Mexico, 24 Stat. 975; Convention on 
Commercial Relations, Dec. 11, 1902, U.S.-Cuba, 33 Stat. 2136. 
50 It is generally agreed that the effect of NSE declarations is purely domestic. Scholars disagree about whether 
Article II grants the treaty makers the power to regulate domestic law in a way that is not contingent upon the 
international obligation in the treaty. See infra notes __ and accompanying text. Here, I assume that Article II does 
grant the treaty makers a limited power of that type.  
51 Dickinson, supra note __. 
52 See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 109 n.2 (1933) (citing treaties). 
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the Coast Guard’s search-and-seizure operations at sea.53 So-called “rum runners” evaded 
enforcement of federal liquor laws by stationing large vessels with contraband beyond the 12-
mile limit, and using small, fast boats to ferry liquor from the large, hovering vessels to the coast. 
The treaties expanded the geographic reach of the executive’s search-and-seizure authority 
beyond the 12-mile limit. However, when federal authorities seized vessels and filed civil 
forfeiture claims, or criminal charges against the rum runners, several lower courts dismissed the 
charges on the grounds that the liquor treaties were not self-executing.54 Dickinson sought to 
demonstrate that the treaties were self-executing—meaning that the treaties themselves 
authorized federal executive action that was prohibited under prior statutes. 
From Dickinson’s standpoint, it was not sufficient to show that the treaties authorized 
search-and-seizure beyond the 12-mile limit (which they clearly did).55 He also wanted to show 
that the treaties extended the geographic reach of U.S. criminal laws. If the treaties did not have 
that effect, he said, they would merely authorize the executive “to search and seize foreign 
vessels which are guilty of no offense.”56 In this respect, Dickinson was mistaken. As the 
Supreme Court explained in United States v. Ford—decided in 1927, one year after Dickinson 
published his article—“[t]he issue whether the ship was seized within the prescribed limit did not 
affect the question of the defendants’ guilt or innocence.”57 In other words, the vessels hovering 
beyond the 12-mile limit were guilty of violating U.S. liquor laws even before the treaties were 
adopted. The problem, absent the treaties, was that personnel on those vessels had a valid 
defense to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts if seizure occurred beyond the 12-mile limit. The 
treaties removed that jurisdictional defense by authorizing seizures beyond the 12-mile statutory 
limit.58 
However, Dickinson wrote his article before the Court decided Ford, and he proceeded 
on the mistaken premise that the treaties must expand the geographic reach of federal criminal 
law to accomplish their intended goals. Here, he confronted a problem. Leading authorities 
suggested that a treaty creating new criminal penalties was constitutionally NSE (meaning that 
Congress must enact implementing legislation before the executive is authorized to prosecute 
offenders).59 If a treaty creating new criminal penalties was constitutionally NSE, then one might 
infer that a treaty expanding the geographic reach of federal criminal laws was also 
constitutionally NSE. At least one lower court had so held.60 However, Dickinson resisted that 
                                                          
53 See Tariff Act of 1922, Sec. 581, 42 Stat. 858, 979 (1922). The United States had similar statutes since 1790 that 
authorized enforcement of federal laws beyond U.S. territorial waters. See Edwin D. Dickinson, Jurisdiction at the 
Maritime Frontier, 40 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12-18 (1926). 
54 Dickinson specifically cited The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838 (D. Conn. 1925), United States v. The Sagatind, 8 F.2d 
788 (S.D.N.Y. 1925), and The Sagatind, 11 F.2d 673 (2nd Cir. 1926), as examples of lower court cases holding that 
the liquor treaties were not self-executing. 
55 See, e.g.., Convention for Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. II, Jan. 23, 1924, 
43 Stat. 1761. 
56 Dickinson, supra note __, at 452. 
57 Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 606 (1927). 
58 See id., at 604-06. 
59 See QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 355-56 (1922). 
60 The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838 (D. Conn. 1925). 
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conclusion.61 So, he argued, the classification of liquor treaties as SE or NSE should be based on 
a treaty interpretation analysis, not a separation-of-powers analysis.62 By shifting the focus of the 
inquiry from a constitutional separation-of-powers analysis to a treaty interpretation analysis, 
Dickinson invented the “one-step” approach to SE doctrine. 
Here, it is crucial to appreciate the distinction between the “one-step” and “two-step” 
approaches. Under the two-step approach, courts perform a treaty interpretation analysis to 
ascertain the content and scope of the international obligation codified in the treaty (step one). 
Then, in step two, they perform a domestic separation-of-powers analysis to determine whether 
legislation is needed to authorize federal executive officers to implement that international 
obligation.63 Under the two-step approach, step two necessarily follows step one because the 
separation-of-powers analysis is contingent upon the treaty interpretation analysis. In contrast, 
when courts apply the one-step approach, they combine both steps into a single step by 
performing a treaty interpretation analysis to answer a domestic separation-of-powers question. 
In his influential law review article, Dickinson urged courts to perform a treaty interpretation 
analysis to answer a domestic separation-of-powers question—specifically, the question whether 
new federal legislation was needed to authorize prosecution of individuals seized beyond the 12-
mile limit. 
The preceding paragraph explains the distinction between the one-step and two-step 
approaches from the judicial perspective. One can also view the distinction from the perspective 
of the treaty makers. Under the two-step approach, the treaty makers use their Article II power to 
make decisions about the content of the international obligation. Certain domestic consequences 
follow from those decisions, but the domestic consequences are contingent upon the international 
obligation. Thus, the treaty makers shape domestic law indirectly: by and through the 
international obligation. Under the one-step approach, though, the treaty makers use their Article 
II power to make decisions about domestic law—specifically, about the allocation of treaty-
implementing authority between Congress and the President. Moreover, their decisions about 
domestic separation-of-powers issues are not contingent upon the content of the international 
obligation. Thus, the one-step approach assumes that the treaty makers can use their Article II 
power to shape domestic law directly.  
Dickinson defended the one-step approach by citing Marshall’s opinion in Foster v. 
Neilson as authority.64 He claimed that Marshall performed a treaty interpretation analysis in 
Foster to distinguish between SE and NSE treaties. As I have explained in detail elsewhere, 
Dickinson’s interpretation of Foster was mistaken, because Marshall applied a two-step 
approach in Foster.65 Nevertheless, Dickinson’s one-step approach—sometimes called the 
“intent doctrine,” because it focuses on the intent of the treaty makers—soon gained widespread 
acceptance. A comparison of the treatment of self-execution in Moore’s Digest and Hackworth’s 
                                                          
61 See Dickinson, supra note __, at 449-50. 
62 See id., at 448-49. 
63 See Sloss, Executing Foster, supra note __. 
64 See Dickinson, supra note __, at 447-50. 
65 See Sloss, supra note __, at 143-64; see also infra notes __ and accompanying text. 
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Digest provides evidence of Dickinson’s influence. (The two Digests provide the best evidence 
of official State Department views at the time they were published.) Moore’s Digest, published 
in 1906, said very little about self-execution because there were few relevant judicial decisions at 
that time. In his brief references to self-execution, Moore said nothing about the “intent of the 
treaty makers,” nor did he endorse a one-step approach to SE analysis.66 In contrast, 
Hackworth’s Digest, published between 1940 and 1944, includes a much more detailed treatment 
of self-execution issues. Moreover, Hackworth enthusiastically endorsed Dickinson’s intent 
doctrine, in which courts apply a treaty interpretation analysis to answer a domestic separation-
of-powers question.67 
 Hackworth probably endorsed the one-step approach because it supported the rise of 
executive discretion in foreign affairs. Professor White has documented the fact that, in the 
period between the two world wars, several distinct doctrinal developments contributed to a 
transfer of constitutional foreign affairs powers from Congress to the executive.68 Dickinson’s 
one-step approach was one such development. His approach assumed that the President has 
discretion, in his treaty-making capacity, to alter otherwise applicable separation-of-powers 
principles by drafting treaty language that vests treaty-implementing authority in the executive 
branch, rather than Congress.69 
The shift from a two-step to a one-step approach raises two distinct issues. First, from a 
constitutional standpoint, does Article II grant the treaty makers the power to shape domestic law 
directly, in a way that is not contingent upon the content of the international obligation? For the 
purpose of this article, I assume that the answer is “yes.”70 Second, and of more immediate 
interest here, the one-step approach induces courts to decide cases by reference to a fictitious 
“intent of the treaty makers.” Let us assume that Article II does grant the treaty makers the power 
to make decisions about domestic separation-of-powers issues that are not contingent upon the 
content of the international obligation. Even so, the fact remains that the treaty makers rarely 
exercise that power. Thus, if a court asks how a particular treaty allocates treaty-implementing 
responsibility between Congress and the President, the correct answer in most cases is that the 
treaty does not address that question. Nevertheless, the accepted doctrine under the one-step 
approach directs courts to apply a treaty interpretation analysis to decide whether legislation is 
needed to authorize executive action to implement the treaty.71 Since the treaty does not answer 
that question (in most cases), courts fabricate a fictitious “intent of the treaty makers.” 
                                                          
66 See John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law, v.5 §§ 750, 758, 765, 776, and 777 (1906). 
67 See Green Heywood Hackworth, Digest of International Law, v.5 § 488 (1943). See also Sloss, Invisible 
Constitutional Transformation, supra note __ (presenting a detailed comparison of Moore’s and Hackworth’s 
Digests). 
68 See G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1 
(1999). 
69 See David Sloss, Invisible Constitutional Transformation, supra note __ (explaining in greater detail the 
relationship between the one-step approach and the rise of executive discretion in foreign affairs). 
70 Professor Vazquez provides an insightful analysis of this question, although he frames the question in slightly 
different terms. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial 
Enforcement of Treaties, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 599, 667-85 (2008). 
71 See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505, 514 (2008); Restatement (Third), § 111(4). 
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In sum, Dickinson’s article had tremendous influence over the subsequent development 
of SE doctrine because he initiated the shift from a two-step to a one-step approach. Under the 
one-step approach, courts apply a treaty interpretation analysis to answer a domestic separation-
of-powers question. Since most treaties do not answer that question, courts create a fictitious 
“intent of the treaty makers.” Over the past few decades, application of the fictitious intent test 
has become the dominant approach to judicial analysis of self-execution issues. 
 
Phase Four: In phase four, lawyers and judges expanded the concept of self-execution to 
encompass the previously distinct doctrine of treaty supremacy. From the Founding until World 
War II, treaty supremacy doctrine and self-execution doctrine were independent, non-
overlapping doctrines. Treaty supremacy addressed the relationship between treaties and state 
law. The treaty supremacy rule consisted of two elements: first, treaties supersede conflicting 
state laws; second, courts have a constitutional duty to apply treaties that conflict with state laws. 
Before World War II, self-execution doctrine operated purely on a federal separation-of-powers 
level. It addressed the division of authority over treaty implementation between Congress and the 
President. Indeed, Quincy Wright wrote in 1951: “the distinction between self-executing and 
non-self-executing treaties has been used in American constitutional law only with reference to 
the agency of the Federal Government competent to execute the treaty and has had no reference 
to the relations between the Federal Government and the States.”72 Thus, before World War II, 
treaty supremacy doctrine applied to treaties that intersected with areas of state regulatory 
authority and self-execution doctrine applied to treaties that intersected with areas of federal 
regulatory authority. There was no NSE exception to the treaty supremacy rule because the 
concept of self-execution did not apply to treaty supremacy cases—i.e., cases involving an 
alleged conflict between a treaty and state law.73 
This picture changed dramatically after World War II. Adoption of the UN Charter and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights unleashed a flood of litigation in U.S. courts between 
1948 and 1954 in which plaintiffs invoked the Charter’s human rights provisions in conjunction 
with the treaty supremacy rule to challenge state and local laws that discriminated on the basis of 
race or nationality.74 Consistent with the traditional approach—which placed treaty supremacy 
and self-execution in separate “baskets”—courts initially decided those cases without reference 
to self-execution doctrine. In the celebrated Fujii case, an intermediate appellate court in 
California ruled that California’s Alien Land Law was invalid because it conflicted with the UN 
Charter’s human rights provisions.75 In short, the lower court decided Fujii as a treaty supremacy 
case, not a self-execution case.  
                                                          
72 Quincy Wright, National Courts and Human Rights: The Fujii Case, 45 Am. J. Int’l L. 62, 64 (1951). 
73 In a forthcoming book, I provide extensive documentation to support the main points summarized in this 
paragraph. See Sloss, Invisible Constitutional Transformation, supra note __. 
74 See Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., The United Nations Charter and United States Civil Rights Litigation: 1946-1955, 69 
IOWA L. REV. 901 (1984). 
75 Fujii v. California, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal.App.2nd 1950). 
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The Fujii decision sparked a huge political firestorm, which in turn generated support for 
a proposed constitutional amendment, known as the Bricker Amendment.76 One key goal of the 
Bricker Amendment was to abolish the treaty supremacy rule.77 Opponents of the Bricker 
Amendment argued that a constitutional amendment was unnecessary because Article II granted 
the treaty makers the power to opt out of the treaty supremacy rule on a case-by-case basis. 
Attorney General Brownell, Secretary of State Dulles, and Harold Stassen (Director of the 
Mutual Security Administration) all presented variants of this argument in their official Senate 
testimony on the Bricker Amendment.78 The New York City Bar Association made a similar 
argument.79 The minority view in the Senate Judiciary Committee report advanced this 
argument.80 Senator George presented the argument during floor debate.81 President Eisenhower, 
himself, made a similar argument in a private letter to John McCloy.82 They all articulated a 
similar message: “A constitutional amendment is unnecessary, because the treaty makers have 
the power to decide that a treaty shall not supersede conflicting state laws, and they can exercise 
that power by specifying—either in the treaty itself, or in a unilateral reservation—that the treaty 
is not self-executing.” Thus was born the “NSE exception to the treaty supremacy rule,” or the 
“optional treaty supremacy rule.” The claim that the treaty supremacy rule is optional played a 
key role in defeating the Bricker Amendment. 
Here, it is important to understand the conceptual shift that created the optional treaty 
supremacy rule. First, in the period between about 1926 and 1943, the one-step approach to self-
execution became the accepted doctrine.83 Under the one-step approach, Article II grants the 
treaty makers the power to decide whether a treaty is SE or NSE, and they can exercise that 
power in a manner that is not contingent upon the content of the international obligation. Then, 
between about 1949 and 1954, lawyers expanded the concept of self-execution beyond the 
congressional-executive concept to encompass the federal-state concept. By combining the one-
step approach with the federal-state concept, the NSE exception to the treaty supremacy rule was 
born. After 1954, a new constitutional understanding established that Article II grants the treaty 
makers the power to decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether a treaty supersedes conflicting state 
laws. According to this new constitutional understanding: 1) the treaty makers decide in the 
                                                          
76 On the political linkage between Fujii and the Bricker Amendment, see Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: 
American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 Yale L.J. 1564, 1598-
1606 (2006). 
77 See generally DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST OF EISENHOWER’S 
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1988). 
78 Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. 
Senate, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953), at 921-22 (testimony of Attorney General Herbert Brownell); id. at 835 
(memorandum submitted by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles); id. at 1059 (testimony of Harold Stassen). 
79 Id. at 244-46 (report submitted by New York City Bar Association). 
80 Constitutional Amendment Relative to Treaties and Executive Agreements, S. Rep. No. 412, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 
at 41-42 (1953) (minority views). 
81 100 Cong. Rec. 2200, 2204 (Feb. 24, 1954) (statements by Senator George). 
82 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1952-1954, v.1, pp. 1833-34 (letter from the President to John J. 
McCloy, Jan. 13, 1954). 
83 The year 1943 is significant because that is when the State Department published the treaty volume of 
Hackworth’s Digest. 
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context of treaty negotiation and ratification whether the treaty is SE or NSE (the one-step 
approach); and 2) an NSE treaty does not supersede conflicting state laws (the federal-state 
concept). The Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law, published in 1965, endorsed the 
NSE exception to the treaty supremacy rule.84 So, too, did Whiteman’s Digest of International 
Law, published in 1970,85 and Professor Henkin’s leading treatise on U.S. foreign relations law, 
published in 1972.86 
The new constitutional understanding that emerged from the Bricker Amendment 
controversy awakened the ghost of Madison’s monster. Since the one-step approach induces 
courts to decide cases by reference to a fictitious “intent of the treaty makers,” and since the 
classification of a treaty as “non-self-executing” now means that the treaty does not supersede 
conflicting state laws, the result is that courts apply a fictitious intent test to determine whether it 
is permissible for state and local government officers to breach U.S. treaty obligations. Indeed, 
that is precisely what the Supreme Court did in Medellín. Before addressing Medellín though, we 
must address the “side channels” of self-execution doctrine that developed in parallel with the 
main channel. 
 
B. Two Side Channels 
The canonical view of SE doctrine traces the origins of the doctrine to Chief Justice 
Marshall’s 1829 opinion in Foster v. Neilson.87 In contrast, the historical account presented here 
suggests that Foster did not become an important source of authority for SE doctrine until Edwin 
Dickinson published his transformative article almost one hundred years later. The ALI’s recent 
Discussion Draft defines self-execution in terms of the political-judicial concept.88 In contrast, 
the preceding historical account largely ignored the political-judicial concept. This section first 
addresses Foster and then turns to the political-judicial concept of self-execution. 
 
Foster v. Neilson:  
I have written extensively about Foster elsewhere. To avoid repetition, I make a few brief 
points here and refer readers to other sources for supporting details.89 First, Foster provides no 
support for an NSE exception to the treaty supremacy rule because there was no state law at 
issue in Foster. Foster involved a dispute over title to real property. The plaintiffs’ claim was 
based on a Spanish land grant, which they alleged was protected by Article 8 of the 1819 treaty 
between the United States and Spain (the “Florida treaty”).90 The published decision in Foster 
                                                          
84 See Restatement (Second), supra note __, § 141. 
85 See Whiteman’s Digest of International Law, v.14, § 29 (p. 302). The Department of State published a fifteen-
volume Digest of International Law between 1963 and 1973, edited by Marjorie M. Whiteman, which includes a 
volume on treaties published in 1970. 
86 See Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution, at 157 (1972). 
87 27 U.S. 253 (1829). 
88 See Discussion Draft, supra note __, § 106 cmt. b. 
89 See especially Sloss, Invisible Constitutional Transformation, supra note __; Sloss, Executing Foster, supra note 
__, at 143-64; David Sloss, When Do Treaties Create Individually Enforceable Rights?, 45 Colum. J. Trans’l L. 20, 
78-90 (2006). 
90 See Foster, 27 U.S. at 253-55, 300-03. 
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does not specify the legal basis of defendant’s claim. However, we know from other sources that 
defendant’s asserted property right was based on federal law, not state law. Daniel Webster 
represented the plaintiffs in Foster. Webster’s papers specify that the defendant, David Neilson, 
was “the occupant under a United States grant.”91 Additionally, in his oral argument, Webster 
conceded that if the Court rejected the validity of plaintiffs’ Spanish land grant, then the land 
“belonged to the United States or her grantees.”92 David Neilson was one of those grantees. As 
the recipient of a grant from the federal government, Neilson’s property claim was based on 
federal law, not state law. 
Second, Marshall’s treaty interpretation analysis in Foster focused on the nineteenth 
century distinction between executory and executed treaties, not the modern distinction between 
SE and NSE treaties. The SE/NSE distinction involves a “who” question: is treaty 
implementation the responsibility of Congress, the President, or the courts? The 
executed/executory distinction involves a “when” question: does the treaty accomplish its goal 
immediately upon entry into force, or is future action necessary to implement the treaty? Article 
8 of the Florida Treaty specified that land grants by Spanish authorities “shall be ratified and 
confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands.”93 In Foster, Marshall distinguished this 
language from hypothetical language stating that land “grants are hereby confirmed.”94 “Had 
such been its language,” said Marshall, “it would have acted directly on the subject.”95 In other 
words, it would have been executed, not executory, because no future action would be necessary 
to implement a provision stating that grants “are hereby confirmed.” However, according to 
Marshall’s analysis, since Article 8 specified that the land grants “shall be ratified and 
confirmed,” the treaty merely “pledge[d] the faith of the United States to pass acts which shall 
ratify and confirm” the grants.96 In other words, he concluded that Article 8 was executory, 
because it obligated the United States to take future action to confirm the grants. Richard Smith 
Coxe, Daniel Webster’s co-counsel, said shortly after the Foster decision that the Court 
construed “the treaty of 1819 as an executory contract between the two nations, which did not of 
itself confirm the existing titles, but merely stipulated that they should be confirmed.”97 
The Court decided United States v. Percheman98 four years after Foster. Joseph White, 
the attorney who represented Percheman, compared the English and Spanish versions of Article 
8 of the Florida Treaty. He argued that “[t]he English side of the treaty leaves the ratification of 
the grants executory—they shall be ratified; the Spanish, executed—they shall continue 
acknowledged and confirmed.”99 Marshall’s analysis of the Spanish and English texts closely 
                                                          
91 The Papers of Daniel Webster: Legal Papers, Volume 3, Part II, at 961 (Andrew J. King ed. 1989) [“Webster 
Papers”]. 
92 Foster, 27 U.S. at 293 (argument of counsel). 
93 Treaty of Amity, Settlement and Limits, U.S.-Spain, Feb. 22, 1819, art. 8, 8 Stat. 252. 
94 Foster, 27 U.S. at 314. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Webster Papers, supra note __, at 994 (emphasis added). 
98 United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 89 (1833). 
99 Percheman, 32 U.S. at 69 (emphasis added). 
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tracked White’s argument in Percheman.100 Marshall contrasted the Spanish version—which (as 
newly retranslated) specified that grants “shall remain ratified and confirmed”—with the original 
English version, which specified that grants “shall be ratified and confirmed.”101 He concluded 
that Article 8 was executed, as it applied to Percheman’s land, because the United States did not 
need to take any future action to perfect Percheman’s already-perfect title.102 Although Marshall 
did not use the words “executed” and “executory,” later nineteenth century Supreme Court 
opinions confirm that Marshall’s analysis in Foster and Percheman focused on the distinction 
between executory and executed treaty provisions.103 
Finally, Marshall applied a two-step approach in Foster, not a one-step approach. 
Marshall’s conclusion that Article 8 of the Florida treaty was NSE was not based solely on a 
treaty interpretation analysis. His treaty interpretation analysis focused on an international law 
question: whether Article 8 was executory or executed. His conclusion that Article 8 was NSE 
involved a second step: a domestic separation-of-powers analysis to determine whether the treaty 
required legislative implementation.104 Granted, step two of the two-step analysis in Foster was 
implicit, not explicit. Thus, the two-step interpretation of Foster is problematic in that it assumes 
that Marshall failed to explain a critical step in his analysis. However, the one-step interpretation 
is even more problematic, because it assumes that Marshall made a fundamental category 
mistake by applying a treaty interpretation analysis to answer a domestic separation-of-powers 
question that the treaty did not address. I prefer to think that Marshall’s SE analysis in Foster 
was merely incomplete, rather than accusing Marshall of failing to understand the difference 
between an international law question (the “when” question) and a domestic separation-of-
powers question (the “who” question). Moreover, if one construes Foster in accordance with the 
two-step approach, then Foster provides a useful template for modern SE doctrine. In contrast, if 
one construes Foster in accordance with the one-step approach, the case is simply a prescription 
for courts to engage in arbitrary judicial decision-making by applying a fictitious intent test. 
 
The Political-Judicial Concept and NSE Declarations 
The preceding account of SE doctrine is incomplete in one important respect: the history 
before World War II focuses on the branch of SE doctrine involving the congressional-executive 
concept. Even in the nineteenth century, though, a separate branch of SE doctrine applied the 
political-judicial concept. That branch of SE doctrine is often called the “justiciability” 
doctrine.105 Traditional justiciability doctrine involves a two-step analysis. In step one, courts 
apply a treaty interpretation analysis to ascertain the content of the international obligation. In 
step two, courts apply a domestic separation-of-powers analysis to determine whether the 
                                                          
100 Compare Percheman, 32 U.S. at 88–89 (Marshall’s opinion) with id., at 68–70 (White’s argument). 
101 Id., at 88–89. 
102 Id., at 86–89. 
103 See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 746 (1838) (stating that Foster “recognised the distinction 
between an executory treaty . . . and an executed treaty”). 
104 For detailed analysis of the second step in Foster, see Sloss, Executing Foster, supra note __, at 159-62.  
105 See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 695, 710-15 
(1995). 
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judicial branch is competent to enforce that particular treaty obligation. The justiciability 
doctrine does not raise the specter of fictitious intent because courts do not apply a treaty 
interpretation analysis to answer a domestic separation-of-powers question. 
During the 1970s or later, lawyers began combining the political-judicial concept with 
the one-step approach. The precise origins of this particular doctrinal shift are not entirely clear, 
but the combination of the political-judicial concept with the one-step approach is closely related 
to the modern practice of attaching NSE declarations to treaties. NSE declarations involve a one-
step approach because—when the treaty makers adopt an NSE declaration—they use their 
Article II power to control domestic implementation directly, in a way that is not contingent 
upon the content of the international obligation.106  
The practice of ratifying treaties subject to NSE declarations raises two distinct sets of 
questions. First, what is the proper interpretation of NSE declarations? The United States ratified 
three human rights treaties with NSE declarations in the period from 1992 to 1994. Those were 
the first treaties that the United States ratified subject to NSE declarations. Congress and the 
executive branch explained those declarations in accordance with the “private right of action 
doctrine,” which is a variant of the political-judicial concept.107 However, more recent political 
branch practice suggests that NSE declarations are properly construed in accordance with the 
congressional-executive concept or the federal-state concept, not the political-judicial concept.108  
Second, the practice of ratifying treaties subject to NSE declarations raises constitutional 
questions. Several scholars have challenged the constitutional validity of NSE declarations;109 
others have defended the practice.110 In my view, much of the constitutional debate has been off-
target because scholars attempt to answer the constitutional question without addressing the 
interpretive question. One cannot present a coherent analysis of the constitutional issues without 
first establishing the correct interpretation of NSE declarations. Space does not permit a detailed 
analysis of the constitutional issues here. Suffice it to say that, in my view, the NSE declarations 
are constitutionally valid if they are construed in accordance with the congressional-executive 
concept, or the federal-state concept, or the private right of action doctrine.111 Professor Bradley 
has defended the constitutional validity of NSE declarations on the theory that such declarations 
should be construed in accordance with the political-judicial concept, and that the declarations 
                                                          
106 See David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1, 35-
36 (2002). 
107 See David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and 
Human Rights Treaties, 24 Yale J. Int’l L. 129 (1999) (defending interpretation of NSE declarations in accordance 
with the private right of action doctrine); see also Sloss, Colum. J. Trans’l L., supra note __, at 106-110 (discussing 
origins of the private right of action doctrine). 
108 See supra notes __ and accompanying text. 
109 See, e.g., Thomas Buergenthal, Modern Constitutions and Human Rights Treaties, 36 Colum. J. Trans'l L. 211, 
221 (1997); Malvina Halberstam, United States Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, 31 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 49, 64-70 (1997). 
110 See Vazquez, supra note __, at 667-85; Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and 
Conditional Consent, 149 U. Penn. L. Rev. 399 (2000). 
111 See Sloss, Invisible Constitutional Transformation, supra note __. 
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bar judicial enforcement of the subject treaties by all litigants in all cases.112 Bradley’s argument 
relies on the unstated premise that Article II grants the treaty makers an unlimited power to order 
courts to refrain from applying supreme federal law. The ALI’s Discussion Draft also appears to 
endorse this position.113 As I have explained elsewhere, Professor Bradley’s position is at odds 
with the principle of judicial independence and with entrenched Supreme Court doctrine 
protecting the due process rights of criminal defendants.114 
Regardless, debates about the constitutional validity of NSE declarations are largely 
theoretical. From a practical standpoint, the fictitious intent problem is the main problem 
associated with modern NSE doctrine. The fictitious intent problem does not arise when the 
treaty makers adopt an NSE declaration because, in that case, the treaty makers have expressed 
their intentions in a concrete form. Similarly, the fictitious intent problem does not arise when 
courts apply a two-step approach (as in the justiciability doctrine), because under the two-step 
approach courts do not apply a treaty interpretation analysis to answer a domestic separation-of-
powers question. However, the fictitious intent problem becomes a serious problem when the 
treaty makers have not adopted an NSE declaration and courts apply a one-step approach in 
conjunction with the political-judicial concept. In such cases, courts apply a treaty interpretation 
analysis to answer a question that treaties do not typically address: whether domestic courts are 
the appropriate government agents to enforce U.S. treaty obligations. Part Three analyzes the 
Supreme Court decision in Medellín to show how the one-step approach induces courts to engage 
in arbitrary judicial decision-making by applying a fictitious intent test.        
 
III 
Fictitious Intent in Medellin 
The Supreme Court held in Medellín that Article 94 of the UN Charter is not self-
executing. The Court relied primarily on the treaty text and the Senate record associated with 
treaty ratification to support its conclusion that the treaty makers intended Article 94 to be non-
self-executing.115 Unfortunately, a vast gulf separates the actual evidence of the treaty makers’ 
intentions from the conclusions that the Court reached on the basis of that evidence. Part Three 
examines Medellín to illustrate the problems associated with the fictitious intent doctrine. The 
first section addresses the Court’s opinion in Medellín. The next section provides an independent 
analysis of the Senate record associated with ratification of the UN Charter. The final section 
discusses, in more general terms, the problems associated with judicial reliance on fictitious 
intent. 
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A. The Court’s Opinion in Medellín 
Chief Justice Roberts began his textual analysis by quoting Article 94(1), which says that 
“[e]ach Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ] in any 
case to which it is a party.” He construed the italicized language to mean that States made a 
commitment “to take future action through their political branches to comply with an ICJ 
decision.”116 Here, the Chief Justice made the classic mistake—which is endemic in self-
execution doctrine—of conflating a “when” question with a “who” question. He correctly noted 
that the phrase “undertakes to comply” is a promise of future action. In nineteenth century terms, 
Article 94(1) is executory, not executed, because treaty ratification, without more, does not 
accomplish the goal to be accomplished.117 The text of Article 94 answers the “when” question: 
it is a promise of future action. 
However, the text of Article 94(1) does not answer the “who” question. The text does not 
support the Court’s conclusion that compliance is to be achieved “through their political 
branches.” As Roberts himself correctly noted in a different case, the “rules of domestic law 
generally govern the [domestic] implementation of an international treaty.”118 Consistent with 
this understanding, the drafters of the UN Charter did not attempt to answer the “who” question. 
They did not purport to decide which branch of government in the United States would be 
responsible for compliance with ICJ decisions, because they recognized that domestic law 
ordinarily governs the internal allocation of responsibility for treaty implementation. Therefore, 
the text of Article 94(1) does not support Roberts’ conclusion that the treaty makers intended to 
vest responsibility for compliance with ICJ decisions in the political branches, rather than the 
courts. 
Roberts turned next to Article 94(2), which states: “If any party to a case fails to perform 
the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may 
have recourse to the Security Council, which may . . . decide upon measures to be taken to give 
effect to the judgment.”119 Based on this language, the Court concluded that referral to the 
Security Council is “the sole remedy for noncompliance.” Additionally, the Court said that the 
“Charter’s provision of an express diplomatic—that is, nonjudicial—remedy is itself evidence 
that ICJ judgments were not meant to be enforceable in domestic courts.”120 With due respect for 
the Chief Justice, the text of Article 94(2) provides absolutely no support for the conclusions he 
purports to derive from that text. First, the statement that “the other party may have recourse to 
the Security Council” simply identifies one option. It does not exclude other options, as Roberts 
would have us believe. Second, and more importantly, the text addresses enforcement between 
States in the international sphere. It says nothing whatsoever about remedies for individuals in 
the domestic sphere. This should come as no surprise because, to quote the Chief Justice again, 
“rules of domestic law generally govern the [domestic] implementation of an international 
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treaty.”121 The question whether an individual can obtain a remedy in a domestic court is a 
question about the domestic implementation of the treaty. The drafters of the UN Charter chose 
not to answer that question because they recognized that it is a question governed by domestic 
law. 
The preceding paragraphs address the entirety of Roberts’ textual analysis in Medellín. In 
sum, the drafters of the UN Charter could have said something in the text about whether Article 
94 has the status of domestic law in the United States. They could have said something in the 
text about which branch of government in the United States is responsible for ensuring 
compliance with ICJ decisions. They could have said something in the text about whether 
individuals have access to domestic courts in the United States to obtain remedies for violations 
of Article 94. However, the drafters of the UN Charter chose not to address any of those 
questions because they assumed that the answers to those questions would be governed by U.S. 
domestic law! Therefore, insofar as Roberts relied on the treaty text to support his conclusions 
about the treaty makers’ intentions, his reliance was misplaced. The ostensible “intent of the 
treaty makers” that Roberts claimed to find on the basis of the treaty text is sheer judicial fantasy, 
without foundation in any actual agreement of the treaty’s drafters. 
Roberts did not rest his decision solely on the treaty text. He also examined the Senate 
record associated with treaty ratification to support his conclusion that the treaty makers intended 
Article 94 to be non-self-executing. Here, Roberts quoted three different statements from the 
Senate record.122 First, he quoted an excerpt from Secretary of State Edward Stettinius’ report to 
President Truman.123 The quoted language repeats, almost verbatim, the language in Article 
94(2) about recourse to the Security Council.124 It says nothing whatsoever about the status of 
the UN Charter as federal law in the United States, or the allocation of responsibility for treaty 
implementation among the branches of the U.S. government. 
Second, Roberts quoted a statement by Leo Pasvolsky, a Special Assistant to the 
Secretary of State. Pasvolsky said: “When the [ICJ] has rendered a judgment and one of the 
parties refuses to accept it, then the dispute becomes political rather than legal. It is as a political 
dispute that the matter is referred to the Security Council.”125 Viewed in context, it is abundantly 
clear that Pasvolsky was referring to disputes between States on the international plane.126 He 
was not referring to disputes between individuals and state governments in the United States—
the type of dispute at issue in Medellín. Here, it is helpful to recall a distinction that Chief Justice 
John Marshall made more than two centuries ago between a case “carried before a court as an 
individual claim” and “a national demand made upon the nation [where] [t]he parties were the 
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two nations.”127 Marshall said that domestic courts are competent to adjudicate a case “carried 
before a court as an individual claim.” However, a demand made upon the nation “is not a case 
for judicial cognizance.”128 In Marshall’s terms, Medellín’s habeas corpus petition was a case 
“carried before a court as an individual claim.” In contrast, Pasvolky’s statement in the Senate 
hearings addressed “a national demand made upon the nation.” Pasvolsky neither stated nor 
implied that domestic courts are not competent to adjudicate individual claims that are based, in 
part, on Article 94. 
Third, Roberts quoted a statement by Mr. Charles Fahy, the State Department Legal 
Advisor. Roberts cited Fahy’s statement to support the Court’s conclusion that “Article 94(2) 
provides the exclusive means of enforcement” for ICJ decisions.129 Here, Roberts used the term 
“exclusive” to signify that the treaty makers intended to preclude domestic judicial enforcement. 
However, Fahy’s statement does not support that inference. Fahy said that “there is no provision 
for the enforcement of such [ICJ] decisions unless the failure to comply constitutes a threat to the 
peace or breach of the peace.” 130 As above, the context makes it perfectly clear that Fahy was 
talking about enforcement between States on the international plane. He was not talking about 
enforcement by individuals on the domestic plane. Granted, the UN Charter and the ICJ Statute 
contain “no provision for the enforcement” of ICJ decisions on the domestic plane. However, the 
decision by the Charter’s drafters to say nothing about domestic judicial enforcement is not 
evidence of an intention to preclude domestic judicial enforcement in the United States. To the 
contrary, it is evidence of a widely shared understanding that the United States would decide for 
itself, in accordance with its own domestic legal rules, whether and how to provide for domestic 
judicial enforcement of the treaty obligation to comply with ICJ decisions. 
The record of a different treaty negotiation in the 1940s confirms this view. At the 1949 
meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights, the United States proposed an amendment to 
the draft Covenant on Human Rights. The proposed amendment provided in part: “The 
provisions of this Covenant shall not themselves become effective as domestic law.”131 The 
representative from the Philippines objected to the U.S. proposal. He explained that, in the 
Philippines, “all international treaties and conventions, when ratified were incorporated without 
further formalities in domestic law.” The U.S. proposal, even if adopted, “could not change the 
constitutional rule of the Philippines.”132 The Lebanese representative added that the appropriate 
mechanism for incorporating the Covenant into domestic law “was entirely a question of the 
constitutional law of States; there was no reason why the Covenant should interfere with the 
application of that law.”133 After further discussion, the Commission voted against the U.S. 
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proposal.134 The Commission’s rejection of the proposed U.S. amendment manifested a shared 
understanding that the question whether the Covenant would be directly applicable as domestic 
law would be governed by the domestic law of individual States, not by the terms of the 
Covenant. The diplomats who negotiated the UN Charter in 1945 had a similar understanding. 
In sum, Roberts’ treaty interpretation analysis in Medellín is akin to analyzing regulations 
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to answer a question about 
California tort law. The fact that SEC regulations say nothing about tort remedies in California 
does not mean that there are no tort remedies in California. Roberts was misled by the one-step 
approach, which induced him to perform a treaty interpretation analysis to answer a question that 
the treaty did not answer. 
 
B. Independent Analysis of the Senate Record 
The Senate record associated with ratification of the UN Charter consists of the following 
documents: Secretary of State Stettinius’ Report to the President (“Stettinius Report”),135 the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report (“SFRC Report”),136 the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee Hearings (“SFRC Hearings”),137 and records of the Senate floor debate reproduced in 
the Congressional Record (“floor debate”).138 I searched those documents to determine what the 
treaty makers said about self-execution. 
The term “self-executing” does not appear in the Stettinius Report, the SFRC Report, or 
the Senate Hearings. It does appear in three places in the Congressional Record. Senator Hill said 
that the United States Constitution is not self-executing. Specifically, he said, the Constitution 
“proved to be a tremendous step . . . . But it could be only a step, for no such document, however 
wisely or prophetically drawn, can be self-executing.” He added: “And so it is with the Charter of 
the United Nations Organization. It is a step, a magnificent and hopeful step, for peace can never 
be achieved if we are afraid even to try.139 Obviously, this statement says nothing about the 
allocation of responsibility for implementing the Charter among the branches of the federal 
government. 
Senator White used the term “self-executing” to describe the proposed Article 43 
agreement between the United States and the United Nations. (Article 43 of the Charter 
envisions agreements between the United Nations and member states “to make available to the 
Security Council . . . armed forces, assistance, and facilities  . . . .”140) Referring to the 
anticipated Article 43 agreement, he said that the agreement “will not be of itself self-executing. 
It will call for the appointment of officials; it will call for the expenditure of public funds. Those 
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will be authorized, I take it, by the Congress of the United States acting in its legislative 
capacity.”141 
Senator Revercomb was the only Senator who used the term “self-executing” to refer 
specifically to the Charter. He said:  
This Charter is not self-executing. It requires future implementing legislation. It 
requires future legislation to fix . . . the powers and the limitations of the [U.S.] 
representatives who will take part in administering the new organization. Even 
legislation will be required fixing the appointment of our representative [to the 
United Nations] and the method of his appointment. Likewise, the Congress will 
act later upon the question of the number of troops and the armaments to be used 
in effectuating the purposes of the Charter and also the extent to which such 
troops may be used.142 
This statement is the most detailed statement by any member of the legislative or executive 
branch addressing the need for legislation to implement the Charter. Notably, Senator 
Revercomb did not suggest that legislation would be needed to implement the Article 94 
obligation to comply with ICJ decisions. 
In addition to searching for the term “self-executing,” I reviewed the Senate record to 
find answers to three questions: 1) did the U.S. treaty makers believe that Article 94 of the UN 
Charter would automatically supersede conflicting state laws? (the federal-state concept); 2) did 
they believe that Article 94 would require implementing legislation to authorize federal 
executive action? (the congressional-executive concept); and 3) did they believe that the Article 
94 obligation to comply with ICJ decisions was directly enforceable in domestic courts (the 
political-judicial concept)? In brief, the treaty makers did not specifically address any of these 
questions, so the Court in Medellín was wrong to conclude that the treaty makers had a shared 
intent regarding any of these questions. 
First, several Senators affirmed the principle that the UN Charter, when ratified, would be 
the supreme law of the land. Senator Ferguson said: “Mr. President, when we ratify this treaty it 
will become the supreme law of the land, because the Constitution provides that a treaty ratified 
and consented to by the Senate shall be the supreme law of the land.”143 Similarly, Senator 
Thomas said: “[W]hen we enter into this agreement, and when the United Nations Charter 
becomes a treaty accepted by us . . . [w]e agree to every provision in it when we accept it. 
Therefore . . . the treaty becomes the supreme law of the land.”144 Senator Lucas quoted the 
language of the Supremacy Clause and said: “The treaty becomes the highest law of the land. We 
should keep this clearly in mind as we discharge the duty of our offices . . . . When we enter into 
this treaty we ought to do so with an understanding of the spirit of the Constitution, which makes 
treaties the supreme law of the land.”145 There is not a single statement in the Senate record 
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contradicting this view. Moreover, as of 1945, the prevailing understanding of the Supremacy 
Clause was that “supreme law of the land” meant that a treaty supersedes conflicting state 
laws.146 Therefore—although there is no evidence that the treaty makers specifically intended 
Article 94 to supersede conflicting state laws, and there is no evidence that they anticipated any 
such conflict—key Senators and executive officials probably shared the belief that the UN 
Charter, including Article 94, would supersede conflicting state laws if a conflict ever arose. In 
any case, there is not a scintilla of evidence to support the view that the treaty makers made a 
conscious choice to opt out of the Constitution’s treaty supremacy rule when the U.S. ratified the 
UN Charter. 
The Senate record includes numerous statements addressing the need for legislation to 
implement particular Charter provisions. However, no legislative or executive officer stated or 
implied that legislation would be needed to implement U.S. obligations under Article 94. The 
Stettinius Report said that legislation would be needed to implement Articles 104 and 105 (which 
involve the “legal capacity” and “privileges and immunities” of the United Nations and 
associated personnel).147 The SFRC Report indicated that legislation would be needed to 
determine the scope of “authority of the United States delegate” to the UN Security Council.148 
Some non-governmental witnesses said that legislation would be needed to authorize “the 
establishment of an International Monetary Fund and an International Bank.”149  
Anna Lord Strauss, the President of the National League of Women Voters, presented the 
most detailed analysis of the need for implementing legislation. She identified two categories of 
legislation. First, legislation would be “needed following ratification to get the Organization into 
operation.”150 Under this heading, she included: legislation to define “the powers of the United 
States delegate on the Security Council;” “[a]rrangements concerning United States forces to be 
placed at the disposal of the Security Council;” and “[a]ppropriations for our share of the United 
Nations Organization expenses.”151 Her second category involved “longer-range legislation 
connected with the Organization.” She included in this category legislation related to U.S. 
“membership in the subsidiary organizations of the Economic and Social Council,” and 
“[a]cceptance by the United States of the optional clause giving compulsory jurisdiction to the 
World Court.”152  
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The Senate record makes clear that the executive branch, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee and various non-governmental witnesses carefully analyzed the need for legislation 
to implement various Charter provisions. Collectively, they identified several different Charter 
provisions that required implementing legislation. However, there is not a single statement in the 
hundreds of pages of documents comprising the Senate record suggesting that legislation would 
be needed to implement U.S. obligations under Article 94 of the Charter. The Court’s conclusion 
in Medellín that the United States made an affirmative decision, at the time of ratification, to 
require legislative implementation for Article 94 is sheer judicial fantasy, without a shred of 
supporting evidence. 
The final question concerns the role of domestic courts in implementing the Charter. The 
SFRC Report does not address domestic judicial enforcement. The Stettinius Report includes one 
reference to domestic courts. It says: “The International Court of Justice . . . has an important 
part to play in developing international law just as the courts of England and America have 
helped to form the common law.”153 Apart from that statement, no government official who 
testified during the SFRC Hearings discussed the role of domestic courts in implementing the 
Charter.154 Several non-governmental witnesses made passing references to domestic courts 
during the SFRC Hearings,155 but no witness specifically addressed the question whether U.S. 
obligations under Article 94 would be enforceable in domestic courts. The Senate devoted six 
days of floor time to discussing the Charter. During floor debate, not a single Senator expressed a 
view about whether the Charter would be enforceable in domestic courts. The statement that 
comes closest to addressing that issue is a statement by Senator George. He said: “Surely no 
American should scoff at international law, because time after time our own Supreme Court has 
recognized the law of nations, and has given effect to the law of nations, which is but another 
term for international law, and has applied the principles of international law in the adjudications 
made by our own courts.”156 Based on this statement, one could infer that Senator George 
believed that some of the Charter’s provisions would be enforceable in U.S. courts. Still, he said 
nothing about Article 94, and his statement does not express a consensus Senate view. 
In sum, the Court’s opinion in Medellín might be construed to mean that Article 94 is not 
enforceable in domestic courts because the treaty makers decided, at the time of ratification, to 
bar domestic judicial enforcement. However, the Senate record demonstrates conclusively that 
the President and Senate did not make any such decision. The hundreds of pages of documents 
comprising the Senate record do not include a single statement by any legislative or executive 
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official expressing any opinion about whether Article 94 is enforceable in domestic courts. 
Insofar as the majority opinion in Medellín suggests otherwise, there is not a shred of evidence to 
support the Court’s conclusion.  
 
C. The Problem of Fictitious Intent 
Unfortunately, Roberts’ opinion in Medellín is consistent with a long line of lower court 
decisions that reach conclusions about self-execution on the basis of a fictitious, judicially 
created “intent of the treaty makers.” Judicial reliance on fictitious intent is the product of a 
flawed methodology that is, in turn, the product of a mistaken interpretation of Foster v. Neilson. 
As explained above, Marshall applied a two-step approach in Foster. He performed a treaty 
interpretation analysis to answer an international law question and he performed a domestic 
separation-of-powers analysis to answer a domestic separation-of-powers question.157 However, 
contemporary lawyers believe that Marshall applied a one-step approach, in which he performed 
a treaty interpretation analysis to answer a domestic separation-of-powers question. This 
misinterpretation of Foster has become so deeply embedded in contemporary legal culture that 
commentators routinely refer to the one-step approach as “Foster-type non-self-execution.”158  
In Medellín, Roberts relied on this mistaken interpretation of Foster to justify his view 
that courts have an “obligation to interpret treaty provisions to determine whether they are self-
executing.”159 The asserted “obligation” is problematic because the question whether a treaty is 
self-executing is a domestic separation-of-powers question. The diplomats who draft treaties do 
not typically use treaties to answer separation-of-powers questions. Hence, the view that courts 
are obligated to perform a treaty interpretation analysis to answer a domestic separation-of-
powers question leads, almost inevitably, to judicial reliance on fictitious intent. Judges believe 
they are required, as a matter of legal doctrine, to base their self-execution decisions on treaty 
interpretation. Treaties rarely address the self-execution question because treaty negotiators view 
self-execution as a domestic legal question. Since the treaty says nothing about self-execution, 
and courts believe they must perform a treaty interpretation analysis to decide whether a treaty is 
SE or NSE, judges are effectively backed into a corner where judicial creation of a fictitious 
intent provides the only escape hatch. 
Judicial reliance on fictitious intent creates three distinct problems. First, judicial 
decision-making is arbitrary. We expect courts to decide cases by applying established legal 
principles to new factual situations. Application of law to fact necessarily involves some 
discretion, but judicial discretion is bounded by the need to conform to established legal 
principles. With respect to SE doctrine, though, established principles do not impose any 
meaningful boundaries on judicial discretion. The established principles direct judges to decide 
cases by determining whether the treaty makers intended the treaty to be self-executing. In the 
vast majority of cases, the treaty makers had no intention regarding self-execution. (Medellín is a 
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good example.) Hence, judges are free to reach any decision that supports their policy 
preferences, without fear of contravening a non-existent “intent.” 
The second problem relates to treaty compliance. When the President ratifies a treaty, he 
makes a binding commitment on behalf of the nation that the United States will comply with its 
treaty obligations. Generally speaking, the Senate does not consent to ratification unless the 
Senate agrees, by the requisite two-thirds majority, that it is in our national interest to comply 
with the treaty. Therefore, the act of ratification is itself powerful evidence that the President and 
Senate intend to comply with the treaty.160 When courts are presented with a self-execution 
question, they would probably reach a result consistent with the treaty makers’ intentions if they 
asked whether the treaty makers intended to comply, instead of asking whether they intended the 
treaty to be self-executing. If the treaty makers did intend to comply (which is usually true), and 
a finding of self-execution is necessary to achieve treaty compliance (which is sometimes true), a 
self-execution holding would give effect to the treaty makers’ intentions. Instead, though, courts 
often find that a treaty is NSE in circumstances where that finding results in non-compliance, 
even though the treaty makers fully intended to comply. (Again, Medellín is a good example.) In 
short, judicial reliance on fictitious intent tends to subvert the treaty makers’ actual intention to 
comply with the treaty. 
The third problem relates to accountability. The Constitution grants the federal political 
branches power to violate a binding treaty obligation. Scholars debate whether this power 
belongs exclusively to Congress, or whether the President has an independent power to violate 
treaties. Regardless, no reputable scholar claims that the Constitution grants state governments, 
or federal courts, the power to violate treaties. Even so, as a practical matter, NSE doctrine grants 
state government officials and federal courts the power to make decisions that are attributable to 
the United States under international law, and that constitute a violation of U.S. treaty 
obligations. Judges and state officers try to evade responsibility for their actions by claiming that 
the political branches decided that the relevant treaty is NSE, and that the treaty violation is 
merely a consequence of that decision. However, in many cases, the claim that the treaty makers 
decided that the treaty is NSE is based on a judicially created, fictitious intent. Consequently, the 
United States breaches its treaty obligations, even though the President and Senate made a 
purposeful decision at the time of ratification to comply with the treaty and no politically 
accountable federal official ever purposefully decided to violate the treaty. In short, we violate 
our treaty commitments but no government officer is accountable. Like a modern Frankenstein, 
the fictitious intent doctrine has brought Madison’s monster to life. 
 
IV 
Recommendations 
Part Four provides recommendations for the political branches and the courts. I divide 
those recommendations into two parts. Recommendations for the political branches are designed 
to help ensure that they express their intentions clearly. Recommendations for the courts are 
                                                          
160 See Duncan B. Hollis, Treaties—A Cinderella Story, 102 ASIL Proc. 412, 413 (2008). 
29 
 
designed to establish an appropriate set of default rules for courts to apply when the political 
branches fail to express their intentions clearly. 
 
A. Recommendations for the Political Branches: Getting the Terminology Right 
For better or worse, modern SE doctrine focuses on the intent of the treaty makers to 
answer questions about the domestic allocation of authority over treaty implementation. Treaties 
rarely answer those questions. The discrepancy between judicial doctrine and the practice of 
treaty negotiators has spawned the fictitious intent problem. Treaty makers can avoid the 
fictitious intent problem by expressing their intentions clearly in the form of unilateral conditions 
included in the U.S. instrument of ratification. Happily, the treaty makers have begun to do so by 
adopting declarations specifying that a particular treaty is SE or NSE.161 Unfortunately, political 
branch explanations of those declarations have been inconsistent. Those explanations have 
vacillated among the congressional-executive concept, the federal-state concept, and the 
political-judicial concept. The President and Senate should agree on clear definitions of terms 
and apply those terms consistently in accordance with agreed definitions. 
The treaty makers should define the terms “self-executing” and “non-self-executing” in 
accordance with the congressional-executive concept. Under this definition, an SE treaty 
provides a rule of conduct for federal executive officials, but an NSE treaty is not law for the 
executive branch unless it is implemented by Congress. The treaty makers should use different 
terminology to express the federal-state concept and the political-judicial concept. Using the 
terms “self-executing” and “non-self-executing” to refer to all three concepts without 
distinguishing among them does not serve any legitimate purpose. Of course, consistent usage of 
terms in accordance with the political-judicial concept, as recommended by the ALI 
Reporters,162 would also promote greater clarity. Nevertheless, there are several reasons to favor 
the congressional-executive definition over the political-judicial definition. 
First, the proposed definition is consistent with the dominant concept of self-execution 
that prevailed from the Founding until World War II. The federal-state concept was not invented 
until after 1945. The most important sources of authority on SE doctrine before 1945 were 
legislative and executive materials, not judicial materials.163 Most legislative and executive 
authorities use the SE/NSE terminology in accordance with the congressional-executive concept, 
not the political-judicial concept.164 
Second, the proposed definition is consistent with most Supreme Court authority. Part III 
of the Court’s opinion in Medellín v. Texas indisputably applied the congressional-executive 
concept, not the political-judicial concept.165 Granted, other portions of the Court’s opinion can 
reasonably be construed in accordance with the federal-state concept or the political-judicial 
concept, but that merely shows that the Court did not consistently apply a single SE concept 
                                                          
161 See supra notes __ and accompanying text. 
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163 See supra notes __ and accompanying text. 
164 See Sloss, Invisible Constitutional Transformation, supra note __. 
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throughout the opinion. The key passage from Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Foster v. 
Neilson is ambiguous, but the best interpretation of that passage is consistent with the 
congressional-executive concept.166 Other leading Supreme Court opinions on self-execution—
including Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.,167 Cook v. United States,168 
Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. City of Knoxville,169 and Whitney v. Robertson170—apply the 
congressional-executive concept, not the political-judicial concept. 
Third, the proposed definition is consistent with the most significant political branch 
practice in the past decade. In September 2008, about six months after the Supreme Court 
decided Medellín, the Senate provided its advice and consent for 78 treaties in four days.171 
Careful analysis of the Senate record demonstrates that the Senate understood the terms SE and 
NSE in accordance with the congressional-executive concept, not the political-judicial 
concept.172 
If the treaty makers want to say that a treaty is not supreme over state law, they can adopt 
a declaration that the treaty does not supersede conflicting state laws.173 Here, one must 
distinguish between the concepts of “supremacy” and “preemption.” If a treaty is “supreme” over 
state law, the treaty supersedes conflicting state laws, but states may enact laws that do not 
conflict with the treaty. In contrast, if a treaty “preempts” state law, states are barred from 
enacting regulations in the field “occupied” by the treaty, even if those regulations do not 
conflict with the treaty.174 In framing unilateral declarations, the treaty makers should distinguish 
clearly among the concepts of self-execution, supremacy, and preemption. Declarations that a 
treaty does not supersede conflicting state laws should be used infrequently because such 
declarations, in Madison’s terms, would put the head “under the direction of the members.”175 
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Cases where the political branches make a conscious choice to subordinate the national interest 
in treaty compliance to the discretion of the fifty states will arise rarely, if at all. 
If the treaty makers want a treaty to be enforceable by federal executive officials, but they 
want to limit private judicial enforcement, they can adopt a declaration that the treaty is “self-
executing,” but it does not “create a private cause of action,” or it does not “confer private rights 
enforceable in U.S. courts.” Indeed, the treaty makers have adopted several such declarations in 
recent years.176 Here again, the terminology is important. If a treaty does not “create a private 
cause of action,” civil plaintiffs may not invoke the treaty offensively, but civil and criminal 
defendants may invoke the treaty as the basis for a defense.177 If a treaty does not “confer private 
rights enforceable in U.S. courts,” then private litigants are barred from invoking the treaty either 
offensively or defensively, but the federal government can sue to enforce the treaty.178 In 
practice, the treaty makers have used the phrase “does not confer private rights” primarily for 
treaties that are not intended to benefit private parties. To clarify this point, the treaty makers 
should express the idea that a treaty “does not confer private rights” in the form of an 
“understanding,” rather than a “declaration.” An “understanding” is an interpretive statement 
designed to clarify the international meaning of the treaty. In contrast, a “declaration” is a 
unilateral statement that can be used to control the domestic application of the treaty without 
modifying the international obligation.179  
Finally, the treaty makers should avoid using the term “not judicially enforceable.” The 
ALI Discussion Draft uses similar terminology,180 but that terminology is problematic. If the 
goal is to limit private judicial enforcement, the terminology discussed in the preceding 
paragraph is preferable, because it preserves the option of a suit by the federal government to 
enforce the treaty. If the treaty makers want to say that federal executive officials lack authority 
to implement the treaty until Congress enacts implementing legislation, a declaration that the 
treaty is “not self-executing” is appropriate. However, there does not appear to be any valid 
reason for adopting the position that federal executive officials are authorized to implement the 
treaty (self-executing), but they may not file suit to enforce the treaty (not judicially 
enforceable). Indeed, I am not aware of any case where the treaty makers have endorsed this 
position. Moreover, a declaration that a treaty is “not judicially enforceable” would raise difficult 
constitutional issues because it implies that the treaty makers can use their Article II power to 
order state and federal courts to refrain from applying supreme federal law. That position is 
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difficult to reconcile with the principle of judicial independence, and with entrenched Supreme 
Court doctrine protecting the due process rights of criminal defendants.181 
 
B. Recommendations for the Courts: Getting the Presumptions Right 
The ALI Discussion Draft says: “The case law has not established a presumption for or 
against self-execution, in the sense of a clear statement or default rule . . . .”182 However, if one 
discriminates among different concepts of self-execution, it becomes apparent that well-
established legal principles support different presumptions in different contexts. First, and most 
importantly, courts should adopt a presumption that the treaty makers did not have any intention 
regarding self-execution, unless they expressed their intention clearly. Or, to state the point 
differently, courts should adopt a presumption that self-execution is not a treaty interpretation 
question, unless the treaty makers adopted explicit language addressing self-execution in the 
treaty text or in the U.S. instrument of ratification. This presumption would bring judicial 
decision-making in line with the actual practice of the government officials who negotiate and 
ratify treaties. The presumption is necessary to remedy the fictitious intent problem, which is the 
central problem with modern SE doctrine. In accordance with this presumption, courts should 
resort to default rules unless the treaty makers adopt explicit language addressing self-execution 
in the treaty text or in the instrument of ratification. The appropriate default rule depends on 
whether the issue presented involves the congressional-executive concept, the federal-state 
concept, or the political-judicial concept. 
Begin with the federal-state concept. As noted above, it is important to distinguish 
between “supremacy” and “preemption.” Absent an explicit declaration (or treaty text) to the 
contrary, courts should presume that a treaty supersedes conflicting state law (a presumption in 
favor of supremacy), but it does not preempt non-conflicting state law (a presumption against 
preemption). The presumption against preemption is justified by the fact that courts apply a 
presumption against preemption in the statutory context.183 In contrast, the presumption in favor 
of supremacy is justified by the text and original understanding of the Supremacy Clause.184 
Moreover, the policy considerations that persuaded the Founders to adopt the treaty supremacy 
rule—fears that actions by state and local officers could trigger a breach of U.S. treaty 
obligations, contrary to the wishes of the federal political branches—also support a presumption 
in favor of treaty supremacy. In short, the presumption in favor of treaty supremacy is necessary 
to tame Madison’s monster: to ensure that the authority of the nation is not subordinate to the 
authority of its constituent parts. 
Consider, next, the congressional-executive concept. The Discussion Draft’s “no 
presumption” rule makes sense as applied to the constitutional doctrine. If a court asks whether a 
treaty is constitutionally SE or constitutionally NSE, the relevant authorities do not support a 
presumption either way. However, if courts are applying a one-step approach (as in the intent 
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doctrine), the appropriate presumption depends upon the relationship between the treaty and 
federal statutes. If the treaty conflicts with a prior federal statute, the presumption against 
implied repeals—which the Court has applied in numerous cases involving conflicts between 
treaties and statutes185—effectively creates a presumption in favor of non-self-execution. 
However, if the treaty does not conflict with a prior federal statute, the President’s duty to 
execute treaties, rooted in the Take Care Clause, establishes a presumption in favor of self-
execution.186 Either presumption should be rebuttable if the treaty makers adopt a clear statement 
in the treaty text or in the instrument of ratification. In accordance with the recommended 
terminology, the clear statement should use the language of “self-execution.” 
Next, consider the political-judicial concept. In this context, courts should distinguish the 
question whether a treaty creates a private right of action from other questions related to judicial 
enforcement. Here, the presumption against implied rights of action under federal statutes 
supports a presumption against private rights of action under treaties.187 That presumption should 
be rebuttable if the treaty makers adopt a clear statement in the treaty text or in the instrument of 
ratification. To avoid ambiguity, the treaty makers should use the term “private right of action,” 
not the term “self-executing,” to overcome the presumption. 
 For other questions related to judicial enforcement,188 courts should apply a two-step 
approach, not a one-step approach (unless there is explicit language in the treaty text or the 
instrument of ratification addressing judicial enforcement in domestic courts). As noted 
previously, the justiciability doctrine combines the two-step approach with the political-judicial 
concept.189 In accordance with justiciability doctrine, courts should apply a treaty interpretation 
analysis to ascertain the content and scope of the international obligation (step one). Then, in 
step two, courts should apply a domestic separation-of-powers analysis to determine whether the 
judicial branch is competent to enforce the specific treaty obligation at issue. For step two (the 
judicial competence question), the Discussion Draft’s recommended “no presumption” rule is 
appropriate. Courts must answer that question on a case-by-case basis. If the analysis in step two 
yields a conclusion that courts are competent to enforce the treaty, the relevant authorities 
support judicial enforcement. As the Supreme Court said recently, “once a case or controversy 
properly comes before a court, judges are bound by federal law.”190 A treaty is federal law, 
unless the treaty is unconstitutional, or it has been superseded by a later-in-time statute, or the 
treaty makers have exercised their Article II power to opt out of the treaty supremacy rule. The 
principle that judges “are bound by federal law” means that they are bound by a treaty that has 
the status of federal law, if the particular treaty provision at issue is within the scope of judicial 
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competence. In such circumstances, courts should not invoke a fictitious “intent of the treaty 
makers” to evade their duty to decide cases in accordance with federal law. 
 
